The Kyoto protocol: just a lot of hot air. by Schmidt, C W
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he Kyoto Protocol on global warming
is struggling to survive in a political climate
hotter than the global climate it was intend-
ed to cool. Three years after being negotiat-
ed by 150 countries in Kyoto, Japan, in
December 1997, this first attempt to set
internationally binding limits on green-
house gas emissions is about as far from its
goal as it was the day it was conceived. Only
24 countries-all ofthem in the developing
world have ratified the protocol so far,
excluding all the major powers that con-
tribute the bulk of emissions worldwide.
Members of the U.S. Congress have criti-
ciued the protocol because they feel it
unfairly saddles the United States with most
of the responsibility for emissions reduc-
tions while requirements imposed oIn devel-
oping countries are considerably more
lenient. This view prevails among infltien-
tial industry stakeholders who continue to
lobby against the protocol's ratification by
Congress.
But even as the Kyoto Protocol faces a
steep uphill battle in Congress, a majority of
both the public and scientific community
ring and that U.S. action is necessary to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
These opinions are dividing what has tra-
ditionally been a Linited front ofconservative
officials and industry representatives who
maintaini that the science onl global warming
is inconclusive and that more stLidy is needed
to justify costly enissions reductiolls. These
critics charge that climate science is based on
computer- models that are only crude approx-
imations of real world conditions, and that
the resultillg scienltific uncertainty about the
interactions of various climatological factors
must be acknowledged.
Recenitly, however, 21 multinational
companiies wenit on record stistiig that global
warming is a threat that must be met with
emissions reductions. Each of these compa-
nies belongs to an organilzationi called the
Business Environmental leadership Council,
administered by the Pew Ceniter on Global
Climate Change in Arlingtoll, Virginia.
Eileen Claussen, president ofthe I'ew Center,
says these companies, which include Shell,
BP Amoco, and American Electric Power,
have described the Kyoto Protocol as a 'first
I
believe that global warming is not only real
but happening now. Faced with steady nlews
reports of melting Antarctic glaciers and
extreme weather patterns, 60% of the
American public subscribes to this view,
according to a 1998 survey by the World
Wildlife Fund. Furthermore, a March 1999
stirvey conducted by the Mellman GroLIp, a
Washington, DC-based polling organization,
fouind that 76% percent of450 congressional
officials, industry association leaders, imiedia
representatives, economists, scientists, and
policy experts think global warming is occLr-
but incomplete step to addressing this issuie
internationally.' And while refraining from
suipporting the Kyoto Protocol itself, several
powerfuil Republicans are stuggesting that the
threat of global warming needs to be taken
seriousIv. These incluide Seniators John
McCain (R-Arizona). chairmani ofthe Senate
Commerce Coommittee, who lauinched a full-
scale inlvestigationI into the science behind
global warming on 17 May 2000, and Bob
Smith (R-New Hampshire), the new chair-
man of the Senate Environmllenlt and PIublic
Works Committee. who is attempting to
forge consensus arouLnd an incentive-based
utilit emissions reductioni bill that addresses
greenhouse gases.
One outstandinig question is whether
these shifting views on global warming will
increase stipport for the Kyoto Protocol in
Congress. Currently, the protocol is so coIn-
tentious and so mired in partisan politics that
ratificationi, at least in the short term, appears
tunlikely. BLit stupporters are hopeful that a
pivotal internationial meeting ofprotocol del-
egates, scheduled for 12-13 Novenmber- 2000
in the Hague, the Netherlands, will amiielio-
r;ate some of these differenices aind pave the
way for its eventual suLccess.
According to the theory ofglobal warmi-
ing, gaseous emissions from fossil friel com-
btustion, partictularly carbon dioxide (C))),
are buiilding up in the atmosphere and trap~
ping heat on the earthl's surface, mutch like
panes of glass trap heat in a greenllotuse.
Power planits, automobiles. and factories have
emitted more grceenhouse gases thani the envi-
ronment can absorb, leading to a 30%/o rise inl
CO) since preindListrial times anid a 145%
rise in anothier imiportant greenilhoLuSe gas,
methanle. Backinug the theory that global
warmilng is already ulpon us are data showingla
that the 1990s were the hottest decade ofthe
last imillleiiiiulm. Pailltilng anl ominilious picture
of the future, a draft report titled ('linate
(Change Impacts oni tie United States: TIe
Potenitial ConsLequences of C,limatte Variahbilitr,
anld Change, issued by the U.S. Alobal
Clhanige Research I'rogram on 12 June 2000,
predicts an increase in global temperatures of
5-10°F over the next century. (Ihis is in
contrast to the 1 996 predictioni by the
Ititergoverntimental lPanel on Climate Change
uponI which the Kyoto Protocol was based,
which estimated temperature increases of
2-6°F.) Global warming on this scale coLIld
produce tremendous cnvironmenrtal impacts,
especially to coastal areas, which woutld be
affected by rising sea levels and increased
storm surges, and some island nationts, whlich
couLld bewiped out altogether.
The Kyoto Protocol-What It Is
The origins of the Kvoto IProtocol date to
the United Natiotns Conferenice onl
E vironimenlt anid [)evelopment (the so-
called Rio Earth Stlmmit), held in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, in 1 992. This meetinig pro-
dticed the United Nations Fra.mework
Convention on Climate Chatige (UNFC-
CC(), a document signted by 150 cotllltries
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and subsequently ratified by the U.S. Senate
that sought to "achieve . . . stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-
phere at a level that would prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference in the cli-
mate system." The UNFCCC split the
world into two halves: Developed countries,
including the former Soviet Union, the
countries of Eastern Europe, and those
belonging to the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (including
the United States) were designated Annex I
Parties. The remaining 129 developing
countries, including China, Mexico, India,
Brazil, and South Korea, were designated
non-Annex I Parties.
As a follow-up to this original treaty, the
Kyoto Protocol was drafted at the Third
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC
(COP3) in December 1997 and marked the
first international attempt to place legally
binding limits not only on CO2 but five
other greenhouse gases as well: methane,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluoro-
carbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The proto-
col's specific goal is to reduce combined emis-
sions among Annex I countries by approxi-
mately 5% from 1990 levels by a 2008-2012
time frame. Each Annex I country is assigned
a specific emissions reduction target. The tar-
get for the United States, for example, is 7%.
Consistent with the terms ofthe UNFCCC,
developing countries are not bound to emis-
sions limits, but rather are dealt with through
the controversial "clean development mecha-
nism" (CDM), which allows them to receive
pollution reduction credits by permitting
industrialized nations to finance projects that
reduce emissions within their borders (the
industrialized nations undertaking the activi-
ties also receive credits). The Kyoto Protocol
also sanctions the concept of"emissions trad-
ing" between industrialized nations. In this
scenario, a nation whose emissions fall below
its treaty limit can sell credit for its remaining
emissions allotment to another nation, which
can in turn use the credit to meet its own
treatyobligations.
Sources ofConflict
Protocol critics claim that developing coun-
tries will be the largest contributors ofgreen-
house gases within the next 15 years due to
industrializa-
tion, defor-
estation, and
increasing use
of vehicles in
those nations.
Because the
protocol im-
poses no bind-
ing reduction
targets on these
countries, its critics in the United States say
it will fail to reduce global emissions while
causing harm to the economies ofthe devel-
oped world. Claussen, who calls this road-
block "the fairness issue" (referring to the
question ofwhether it is fair that the devel-
oped countries should bear the economic
brunt of emissions reductions if they aren't
the major contributors), counters that rather
thanjustifying minimal action, fairness actu-
ally demands decisive U.S. action to reduce
emissions for two reasons. First, developed
countries are currently and historically
responsible for more emissions than anyone
else; second, developed nations can afford to
pay the associated costs. "But there's no
question that developing nations will even-
tually need to reduce their emissions," she
adds. "It's also in our interest that they have
clean development. However, it would be
impossible for them to take on
reduction targets within the same
time frame as developed countries.
And I'm not sure that it's ethical,
either."
Many in Congress have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to buy in to
this argument. InJuly 1997, months
before the Kyoto Protocol was
signed, Senators Robert Byrd
(D-West Virginia) and Charles
Hagel (R-Nebraska) introduced a resolution
that the United States shouldn't sign any
treaty limiting or reducing greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties unless the
protocol or other agreement also mandated
commitments for developing countries with-
in the same time period. Furthermore, this
Byrd-Hagel resolution, as it came to be
called, prohibited the signing ofa treaty that
might "result in serious harm to the economy
ofthe United States."
The Byrd-Hagel resolution was passed by
a unanimous vote in the Senate. But in a
move that still rankles the protocol's critics
(while delighting environmentalists), Vice
President Al Gore went to Kyoto during the
final hours ofCOP3 and instructed U.S. del-
egates to show more flexibility in agreeing to
the terms of the protocol, the stated opposi-
tion ofthe Senate notwithstanding. The pro-
tocol was subsequently signed by the United
States at COP4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
in 1998. Signing the protocol merely indi-
cates intent to comply. Ratification is the
process that commits a country to treaty pro-
visions. Conservative stakeholders have
argued that Gore's actions helped turn the
Kyoto Protocol into a partisan issue, and that
furthermore the vice president acted without
the full support of the Clinton administra-
tion, which they claim never intended to
endorse the protocol's mandated emissions
targets. Says David Garman, chiefofstafffor
Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska), "The
protocol was signed even though the Senate
didn'twant it signed. This has created a lot of
ill feelings in the Congress to the extent that
some creative energy policies aren't being
adopted because they areviewed as premature
implementation ofKyoto provisions."
One particularly vociferous critic,
Representative Joseph Knollenberg
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(R-Michigan), has tried to block any federal
spending on CDM and emissions trading
programs, describing them as unauthorized
Kyoto provisions that ignore the Byrd-Hagel
resolution. Says Knollenberg, "To spend tax-
payer dollars on carbon emissions trading and
clean development mechanisms is against the
Constitution and a bypass of the law. The
White House could send the Kyoto Protocol
for ratification by the Senate, but they know
itwon't pass so they try to imple-
ment it through abackdoor."
Earlier this year, Knollen-
berg attached language to a g
number offederal spending bills
that stated in part, "Hereafter,
no funds shall be used for the
Kyoto Protocol, including such
Kyoto mechanisms as carbon
emissions trading and the clean
development mechanism that are
found solely in the Kyoto Protocol and
nowhere else in the laws of the United
States." This language was ultimately aban-
doned due to pressure from environmental-
ists, moderates in Congress, certain industry
sectors, and eventually even the Republican
leadership in favor ofexisting language (also
authored by Knollenberg) that simply forbids
using federal funds for Kyoto implementa-
tionwithout Senate ratification.
Both the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency and the White House have argued
that, as long as they don't issue rules specifi-
cally implementing the protocol, they are free
to explore options to address global warming.
Consequently, a number of federal agencies
are exploring the CDM and emissions trad-
ing for their own programs. For example, the
U.S. Agency for International Development
is engaged in several projects investigating the
use of the CDM in developing countries,
including India, Brazil, and countries in
Central and South America. And Smith is
developing an incentive-based utility emis-
sions reduction bill that could include emis-
sions trading provisions for C02-a poten-
tially controversial measure because oppo-
nents could suggest that the measure is an
attempt to implement the protocol through
the back door. Armond Cohen, executive
director of the Boston, Massachusetts-based
Clean Air Task Force, a national environ-
mental organization that has provided
Smith's committee with recommendations
for the proposed legislation, says that, if
passed, Smith's approach could create an
appropriate legislative mechanism for regulat-
ing CO2. "I don't think this bill represents
Kyoto implementation," he adds. "Rather
than the 7% cap mandated by the protocol,
we've suggested the cap be set at 1990 levels,
which was established during the Rio
Convention that the Senate ratified. We've
also proposed 2005 as the return date. This
isn't inconsistent with the Kyoto Protocol,
but it's not an endorsement, either." Garman
notes, however, that the emissions cap sug-
gested by the protocol is a voluntary goal,
whereas the Smith approach entails a legally
bindingstatutoryprovision.
Another heavily debated aspect of the
Kyoto Protocol concerns the costs of imple-
mentation, which critics say place unaccept-
able economic burdens on some industry sec-
tors. Knollenberg, for example, has suggested
that implementing the Kyoto Protocolwould
result in the loss of 2.4 million jobs and
reduce the average annual income by nearly
$2,700. But Dan Lashof, a senior scientist
with the Natural Resources Defense Council
in Washington, DC, counters that these
kinds ofcost estimates are based on compli-
cated economic models that are heavily
dependent upon input parameters. Lashof
says studies that incorporate the benefits of
increased energy efficiency and reduced
dependency on
foreign oil,
among other
parameters,
Kyoto emis-
sions reduc- _ g
tions could
be achieved
while actual- _
ly increasing
employment
and saving money for consumers. To illus-
trate, he cites the World Wildlife Fund's
August 1999 report America's Global
Warming Solutions, which finds that compli-
ance with the Kyoto Protocol entirely
through domestic action could create
900,000 new jobs and reduce energy bills by
nearly$400 perhousehold.
ACritical Meetingfor PartyDelegates
The definitions and rules for implementing
the CDM and emissions trading, as well as a
number ofother important protocol-related
issues such as how deforestation and forest
protection influence global warming, will be
discussed at COP6 in the Hague this
November. This session will establish the
ground rules for implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol and will be the most impor-
tant session since the protocol was adopted
in 1997. According to a UNFCCC fact
sheet, COP6 will be considered successful if
it triggers ratification among Annex I coun-
tries in sufficient numbers to bring the treaty
into force and if it "motivates significant
action by developing countries to enhance
their contributions to the achievement ofthe
convention's objectives."
XWhether COP6 is likely to
produce any changes that
increase chances of congres-
sional ratification in the
United States is a matter of
debate. Says Lashof, "I'm
optimistic that the United
States will ratify the protocol.
I think that COP6 marks the
beginning ofserious consider-
ation. It's something that
won't happen immediately, but it begins a
process that will lead to ratification in the
next fewyears.`
Other stakeholders are not so sure. "I'm
sure there will be an effort to repackage the
agreement as having meaningful developing
country participation and reliance on market
mechanisms," says Garman. "But I don't
think itwill sell. It takes 67 votes to ratify the
protocol, andso farI onlysee about 20."
Ultimately, a number ofimportant ques-
tions remain. Will the rest of the Annex I
countries ratify the protocol even without
United States participation? Can the protocol
achieve its goals if the United States doesn't
buy in? And finally, is it appropriate to pur-
sue emissions reductions through a binding
international treaty rather than through vol-
untary market-driven incentives? In response
to this last question, Lashof points out that
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions rose by 12%
during the last decade, despite pledges to sta-
bilize emissions at 1990 levels made at the
Rio Earth Summit. Perhaps theonlycertainty
is that if current global warming predictions
prove correct, the next century will give rise
to a radical transformation of our planet.
Certainly any actions that could help reverse
this trend are to be taken seriously.
Charles W. Schmidt
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